IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

MUSOMA SUB REGISTRY

AT MUSOMA

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 01 OF 2023

(Arising from Economic Case No. 19 of 2019, of the District Court of Tarime at Tarime)

WANKURU MORENDA @ RHOBI SANGA @ ISAYA ..... APPELLANT

VERSUS

REPUBLIC..... RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

4th May & 14th July 2023
F. H. Mahimbali, J.

On 19th May 2019, while at Kegonga Village within Tarime District in Mara region, the appellant by name of Wankuru S/o Morenda @ Rhobi s/o Sanga @ Isaya was arrested by prosecution being led by PW1 – Park Ranger of Serengeti National Park on allegation of being in possession of government trophy, to wit five elephant tusks of 21.3 Kg.

The story behind his arrest was this. PW1 – Ezekiel Kurwa who is a park ranger with Serengeti National Park got an intelligent criminal information from one reliable informer that the appellant was in possession of elephant tusks and that he was in search of seller to buy

the said goods. In that snatch, he faked himself to be the buyer and through the said informer he managed to meet the appellant and agreed of the deal that he had a total of five elephant tusks and that each kilogram would be sold at 150,000/= TZS. After the discussion had been over, the appellant went to collect the said cargo for concluding the said business. By that time, the PW1 together with his fellow officers organized themselves well as they took hid. On his return on motorcycle with the cargo at the point of their agreement, the appellant was arrested being in possession of the said cargo weighing 21.3 kg while the motorist escaped. The estimated value of the said cargo is TZS: 26,475,900/=.

The appellant was then charged at the trial court with one offence of being in unlawful possession of government trophy contrary to section 86(1) and (2) (b) of the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 5 of 2009 read together with paragraph 14 of the First schedule to and Section 60 (2) of the Economic and Organized Crime Control Act Cap 200 R.E 2002 as amended by the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 3 of 2016. He was consequently convicted and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment.

Aggrieved by both conviction and sentence, the appellant opted for this appeal armed up with a total of five grounds of appeal, namely:

1. *That the trial court erred in law and facts by convicting the appellant in absence of proof of proof beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution's evidence.*
2. *That the trial court erred in facts for convicting the appellant despite the contradictions and inconsistences by the prosecution's evidence.*
3. *That the trial court's proceedings are irregular and unprocedural in its conduct.*
4. *That the trial court erred in law and fact for adducing the reasons for the severe punishment to the appellant contrary to the aggravated and mitigating factor adduced during trial.*
5. *That the trial court erred in law and fact for failure to take into account the appellant's defense.*

During the hearing of the appeal, the appellant was represented by Ms Marry Joachim learned advocate whereas the republic who resisted the appeal was represented by Ms Agma Haule learned state attorney who was being accompanied by her fellow state attorneys: Ms Mgumba, Mr. Ngowi, Abdulkheri and Ms Joyce.

On the first ground of appeal, it has been the submission by Ms Marry Joachim for the appellant that the prosecution's case at the trial court was not established beyond reasonable doubt as per law. The reasons for the said non proof of the case beyond reasonable doubt are:

Firstly, the alleged cargo (arrested with – exhibit P2) has not been established beyond reasonable doubt as per PW3's testimony. That the cargo is elephant tusk is because of its weight and colour, is scientifically not sufficient to make others believe that the said cargo is nothing but the alleged trophy.

Secondly, the manner the said appellant was arrested also raises doubts. As he was carried on motorcycle, it was not clear how the troop of four police officers failed to arrest both the appellant and the motorist. In the circumstances, it is not clear whether the cargo really belonged to the appellant.

Thirdly, there was no any photograph tendered as exhibit as per testimony by Pw2 (at page 55 of the typed proceedings). Similarly, the alleged panga found with the appellant during his search, was not tendered as exhibit.

Fourthly, the argument by the appellant's counsel has been this, the manner the said informer was described and the manner PW1 pretended to be the buyer, creates a dubious transaction considering the fact that it was night time and that other police officers were in hide. It is not clear then how the PW1 communicated to them who then managed to arrest the appellant.

All these, Ms Marry Joachim considered as serious reasonable doubts which weaken the prosecution's case in which conjunctively must benefit the appellant.

The second ground of appeal was abandoned by the appellant's counsel as per reasons best known to her.

With ground no.3 of the appeal, it concerns procedural irregularity on the conduct of the case during trial.

First, the manner the case file exchanged hands from Hon. Baryaruha to Hon. Myombo, successor magistrate has not been procedural as per law, though she could not cite the said law. She submitted that there ought to be strict compliance of the law in taking over a partly heard case from one judicial officer tom another. In the current case, there was no any reason stated as per law why the case moved from Baryaruha to Myombo.

Secondly, the manner search was done, it was not in conformity with the mandatory section 38(1) of the CPA for the authorization of the said search. On this, Ms Marry Joachim sought support from the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of **Ayubu Mfaume Kiboko and Another V. The Republic**, Criminal Appeal no. 694 of 2020, CAT at

DSM at page 18. She prayed that the said exhibit P1 be expunged from record as the same is nullity in the eyes of the law.

With ground no.4 of the appeal, she submitted that, looking at the reasoning of the trial magistrate, the maximum sentence imposed did not consider the appellant's mitigating factors. He being the first offender, the maximum sentence imposable ought to have been the minimum sentence provided as per law.

Lastly, Ms Marry Joachim was of the view that the trial magistrate did not consider the defense testimony by the appellant at the trial court. On this, she contended that, had he properly evaluated the defense testimony, he wouldn't have arrived at the wrong conclusion he did. She considered the error as magnificent one occasioning failure of justice.

From the above submissions, Ms Marry Joachim was of the considered view that the appeal be allowed, conviction quashed and sentence thereof be set aside. The appellant then should be set free forthwith.

In resisting the appeal, Ms Agma Haule learned state attorney for the respondent on the first ground of appeal, she admitted that there

was an irregular change of trial magistrate from Hon. Baryaruha to Hon. Myombo as successor trial magistrate as provided under section 214 of the CPA, Cap 20 R.E 2022. She clarified that the proceedings don't tell no reason for the said re-assignment nor reasons for taking over. However, she considered the anomaly as minor one since it happened prior to the hearing of the case.

With the issue of illegal search as per strict compliance to section 38(1) of the CPA, she had a different view that, since this current search was subject to the Wildlife Conservation Act as provided under section 106, the restrictions imposed under section 38 of the CPA do not apply in the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the view as stated in the case of **Ayubu Mfaume Kiboko** (Supra) does not apply in the current case.

Responding to ground number five of the appeal, Ms Agma Haule was of the view that reading the judgment of the trial court, it is clear that at page 10 of the typed judgment, the trial magistrate summarized the appellant's testimony, reasoned it and eventually differed with it as it was unworthy of credit in place of the prosecution's evidence.

On the ground that the prosecution's case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, she considered it as misplaced. She reasoned that the

description of the said trophy (P2 exhibit) by PW3 as ivory/elephant tusks, the description is unique and satisfactory. She exemplified that, by the description that it was heavy, smooth, have no big hollows in between, sharp in edge ends, to her those features are distinctive from the Banyankole cows' horns and other animals' horns as well.

Regarding the non-arrest of the motorcyclist, it is irrelevant in the circumstances of this case as there is plenty evidence how the appellant was in deal discussion with the PW1 and that the attention of PW1 was first to arrest the appellant and not otherwise. The escape of the motorcyclist had little impact on the case than the escape of the culprit himself. In totality of the evidence by the prosecution via PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5, she submitted that there is no doubt that the facts of the case connecting the appellant and the alleged tusks is so connected to the extent that there is no any reasonable doubt explained by the defense/appellant for him to benefit.

On the non-tendering of panga and photographs as exhibits of the case taken at instance of the arrest of the appellant, she admitted that fact, however it was not so material to the extent of weakening the prosecution's case. The same had weight, but the none tendering did not weaken the prosecution's case as the necessary ingredients were

only two: possession of the said government trophy and absence of the valid license authorizing possession of the same. Since exhibits P1, P2 and P3 and the testimony of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4(independent witness) and Pw5, carry sufficient weight on the proof of the case beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was arrested in possession of the government trophy unlawfully as he had no license of possessing the same.

On the argument that the manner the PW1 communicated with the informer and connected with the appellant, she submitted that the testimony of PW1 and PW5 is very clear on that. That PW1 first got an intelligent criminal information and communicated it with his superior (PW5), therefrom , the arresting trap was organized by PW1 and PW5 where eventually yielded into the arrest of the appellant being in possession of the said trophy unlawfully.

How was the PW1 been able to communicate with his fellows (PW2, Pw5 etc) by signs after he had arrested the appellant while it was night time (around 19.00hrs), Ms Agma was of the view that as the other officers were not far away from that point, it remained an intelligent means of communicating amongst the investigation officers

which should not be exposed at public for fear of intelligent tactic means leakage for future incidences.

On these submissions, she was bold that the prosecution's case was established beyond reasonable doubt as well stated in the case of **Daniel Malongo Makasi Vs. Rep**, Consolidated Criminal Appeal no. 346 of 2020/ 475 and 476 of 2021, CAT at Dom, at pages 21 and 22 on credibility of witnesses.

Lastly, on the fourth ground of appeal that the imposed sentence of 30 years is so harsh, Ms Agma was of the view that the said sentence was in conformity with the law and it was imposed upon considering both the mitigating and aggravating factors.

On these submissions, Ms Agma was of the considered view that the appeal is bankrupt of any merit and thus should be dismissed in its entirety.

On her rejoinder submission, Ms Marry Joachim first reiterated her submission in chief and secondly added that preliminary hearing done by Hon. Baryaruha is part of hearing as per law. Thus, it has the same effect on succession situation.

That the search was done in conformity to section 106 of the WCA, by itself did not authorize PW2 to hold the same.

With all this, she maintained her former stance that the prosecution's case as weak and pregnant of legal errors warranting the allowing of the appeal. She insisted on the appeal to be allowed, conviction quashed and sentence be set aside and that the appellant be set at liberty.

Having carefully scanned and considered the arguments and submissions for and against the appeal, it is now high time this court responds whether the appeal is meritorious.

To start with, I will consider the merits of the appeal on the irregularity issue of the proceedings as raised. That is none-compliance to section 214 of the CPA and that of section 38(1) of the CPA. On the compliance to section 214 of the CPA, it is undisputed that in this case, the trial of the case at the trial court commenced with Hon Baryaruha until when she conducted preliminary hearing of the case. Thereafter, for unknown reasons in the case file, the case shifted hands from the predecessor magistrate to Hon. Myombo – successor magistrate. So long as the case was assigned to Hon. Baryaruha, now being guided with individual calendar of a judge or magistrate, it was expected that

only him or her should have completed the case unless one was prevented so from good cause as per law. Under section 214(1) of the CPA, a magistrate who takes over a partly heard case or partly conducted committal proceedings, must disclose in the record, the reasons for his predecessor's failure to complete the trial or committal proceedings. The section provides as follows:

> ***214.-(****1) Where any magistrate, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in any trial or conducted in whole or part any committal proceedings is for any reason unable to complete the trial or the committal proceedings or he is unable to complete the trial or committal proceedings within a reasonable time, another magistrate who has and who exercises jurisdiction may take over and continue the trial or committal proceedings, as the case may be, and the magistrate so taking over may act on the evidence or proceeding recorded by his predecessor and may, in the case of a trial and if he considers it necessary, resummon the witnesses and recommence the trial or the committal proceedings.*
>
> *(2) Whenever the provisions of subsection (1) apply the High Court may, whether there be an appeal or not, set aside any conviction passed on evidence not wholly recorded by the magistrate before the conviction was had, if it is of the opinion that the accused has been materially prejudiced thereby and may order a new trial.*

> *(3) Nothing in subsection (1) shall be construed as preventing a magistrate who has recorded the whole of the evidence in any trial and who, before passing the judgment is unable to complete the trial, from writing the judgment and forwarding the record of the proceedings together with the judgment to the magistrate who has succeeded him for the judgment to be read over and, in the case of conviction, for the sentence to be passed by that other magistrate.*

According to law, the conditions imposed to a successor magistrate before proceeding over with the matter previously handled by another magistrate either partly heard on trial or its committal proceedings, may act on the evidence or proceeding recorded by his predecessor and may, in the case of a trial and if he considers it necessary, resummon the witnesses and recommence the trial or the committal proceedings. In my considered view, the conditions imposed also extend up to preliminary hearing as it is also part of hearing. In the case of **Director of Public Prosecutions vs Henry Kileo & Others** (Criminal Appeal No. 239 of 2013) [2016] TZCA 241 (29 April 2016), the Court of Appeal insisted on the strict compliance of this legal procedure. See also **Shomari Mohamed Mkwama vs Republic** (Criminal Appeal No. 606 of 2021) [2022] TZCA 644 (21 October 2022)

What is the effect of none-compliance to the provisions of section 214 of the CPA? The same law under subsection 2 provides for an answer that:

> *Whenever the provisions of subsection (1) apply the High Court may, whether there be an appeal or not, set aside any conviction passed on evidence not wholly recorded by the magistrate before the conviction was had, if it is of the opinion that the accused has been materially prejudiced thereby and may order a new trial.*

In the case of **Murimi and Others vs Republic** (Criminal Appeal No. 551 of 2015) [2019] TZCA 33 (4 April 2019) the Court of Appeal upon the introduction of overriding objective brought vide the written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 8 of 2018, while also considering their previous decision in the case of **Charles Bode v. R.**, Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2016 (unreported) the Court had this consideration when faced with a similar position:

> *Even assuming that the successor judge failed to explain to the appellants their rights in terms of S. 299 of the CPA, still we think that there was no injustice occasioned in view of the introduction of Section 3A in the Appellate Jurisdiction Act Cap. 141 (AJA) which was brought vide the written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 8 of 2018.*

That said, they dismissed such a ground of appeal. Similarly in this case, and since each case is to be considered on its own merits, I find

no merit in this ground as nothing occasioned any failure of justice. The situation would have been different, had there been evidence partly heard by the predecessor magistrate and upon commencement of successor magistrate denied them the right to resummon had there been such a request. The rule as it is, is more discretionally on its applicability but not compulsiveness on nature. Thus, depending on the circumstances of each case, the rule is not restrictive.

Twin to this irregularity issue, is the application of section 38(1) of the CPA. Ms Marry Joachim was of the submission that there was no strict compliance to the law as it is not clear whether the PW1 and PW3 had authority of search as per law as done. Ms Agma Haule learned state attorney for the Republic was of the view that this being an offence under the Wildlife Conservation Act, the cited section does not apply but section 106 of the WCA. I had to revisit the said law to get satisfied of the said proposition by Ms Agma Haule whether it suits in the circumstances of the case. The said law reads, and I hereby quote:

> *106.-(1) Without prejudice to any other law, where any authorised officer has reasonable grounds to believe that any person has committed or is about to commit an offence under this Act, he may-*
>
> *(a) require any such person to produce for his inspection any animal, game meat, trophy or weapon in his possession or*

any licence, permit or other document issued to him or required to be kept by him under the provisions of this Act or the Firearms and Ammunition Control Act;

(b) enter and search without warrant any land, building, tent, vehicle, aircraft or vessel in the occupation or use of such person, open and search any baggage or other thing in his possession: Provided that, no dwelling house shall be entered into without a warrant except in the presence of at least one independent witness; and

(c) seize any animal, livestock, game meat, trophy, weapon, licence, permit or other written authority, vehicle, vessel or aircraft in the possession or control of any person and, unless he is satisfied that such person wil appear and answer any charge which may be preferred against him, arrest and detain him.

(2) It shall be lawful for any authorised officer at all reasonable times to enter the licensed premises of any trophy dealer and to inspect the records which are required to be kept under the provisions of this Act.

(3) Any person detained or things seized under the powers conferred upon the authorised officer by this Act may be placed in custody and shall be taken as soon as possible before a court of competent jurisdiction to be dealt with according to law.

(4) It shall be lawful for any authorised officer to stop and detain any person who he sees doing, or suspects of having done, any act for which a licence, permit, permission or authority is required under the provisions of this Act for the purpose of requiring such person to produce the same or to

allow any vehicle, vessel or aircraft of which he is the owner or over which he has control to be searched.

(5) It shall be lawful for any authorised officer to order any person stopped or arrested by him to submit in writing his name and address and the details of any licence, permit or other authority issued to him or any other article, thing or document in his possession.

Perhaps the interesting question would be, who is this an authorized officer as per the Wildlife Conservation Act? Section 3 of the said Wildlife Conservation Act provides an answer:

"authorised officer" means the Director of Wildlife, a wildlife officer, wildlife warden, wildlife ranger or police officer, and includes the following-

(a) An employee of the Forest and Beekeeping Division of, or above the rank of forest ranger;

(b) An employee of the national parks of, or above the rank of park ranger;

(c) An employee of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area of, or above the rank of ranger;

(d) An employee of the Fisheries Division of, or above the rank of fisheries assistant;

(e) An employee in a Wildlife Management Area of a designation of a village game scout;

(f) An employee of the Marine Parks and Reserve of, or above the rank of marine parks ranger;

(g) An employee of Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority of or above the rank of conservation ranger;

(h) An employee of the Antiquities Division of, or above the rank of conservator of antiquities; and

(i) Any other public officer or any person, who shall be appointed in writing by the Director;

"Board" means the Board of Trustees of the Tanzania Wildlife Protection Fund established by section 92.

In scrutiny to exhibit P1 (Search order and seizure) issued under section 106 (1) (a), (b), and (c) of the WCA, Act No.5 of 2009 as revised in 2022, in my considered view, I have not encountered any irregularity complained of by the appellant's learned counsel that has prejudiced the appellant's right. The application of section 38(1) of the CPA as broadly interpreted by the Court of Appeal in the case of **Ayubu Mfaume Kiboko and Another** cannot apply in the current case to fault the proceedings thereof. That said, this ground of appeal fails.

On consideration of the first ground of appeal that the prosecution's case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, I have assessed the submissions by the appellant's counsel that there was no such strong and convincing evidence that established the prosecution's case beyond reasonable doubt. I have equally digested the submission's

in reply thereof by Ms Agma Haule. In my careful analysis of the whole prosecution's case via PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5's evidence, I am of the considered view that the prosecution's case was established beyond reasonable doubt as required by law. Scanning the evidence by PW1 and PW5, their story is so connected to the extent that there is nothing to fault. The argument on whose possession the alleged trophy was found with, whether the appellant or the motorcyclist, the PW1's evidence is very clear on how he first met the appellant, discussed the deal on earlier hours of 19th May 2019 and later set time and place to meet. I wonder if there was any mistaken of identity if the person, he earlier met is not the appellant. Should he have that genuine claim, was expected to feature out on the cross-examination. I have not seen such a question.

Whether the alleged trophy (exhibit P2) is not a trophy but may be a banyankole cow horn or any other animal horn, is a serious allegation on the authenticity of the said fact. This in my opinion forms the central part of the case. The charge sheet consented by the DPP and dully conferred its jurisdiction to be tried by the subordinate court, has the following particulars:

WANKURU S/O MORENDA @ RHOBI SANGA S/O SANGA @ ISAYA *on 19th day of May 2019 was found in unlawful possession of* ***five elephant tusks weighing 21.3 Kg****, worth Tshs. 26,475,900/= the property of the United Republic of Tanzania.*

According to the charge sheet and the particulars of the offence charged, what was supposed to be established is whether the said appellant (Wankuru) was arrested being in unlawful possession of the alleged trophies. For that to be established, the first duty was whether the alleged trophies were really as per law. PW1 in his testimony assured the trial court from the information he obtained from his informer that what the appellant was trading was government trophy known as elephant tusk. When asked by the appellant how the said exhibit arrested with is elephant tusk, thus trophy as per law, the PW1 who is a park ranger but working in intelligence unit of the Park had this in his reply:

"....the said government trophy is well known that is tusk, I have 15 years' experience, I know it....."

However, PW3 who is the Wildlife Officer and a graduate in Bachelor of Science in Wildlife Management from Sokoine University, on exhibit P2

described them as elephant tusks because of the following descriptions, he stated at page 63 of the typed proceedings:

> *"... something that enabled me to know that the said items are tusks, are their weight. It is heavy. Secondly, it is smooth. The tusks are sharp to its edge and also the tusks has no big hollows. Those factors enabled me to know that the same are tusks."*

If the appellant was not satisfied with these called scientific descriptions of elephant tusks from an expert of wildlife (PW3), it was expected that there ought to have been such relevant questions how the said tusks are then differentiated from other animal horns especially those of Banyankole cattle/cows. As it appears to be a question from the bar now, it is considered as an afterthought. Such a question though very relevant in providing relevant scientific description of an elephant tusk, ought to have been raised at trial. To raise it now, there is no one to answer it. It is a principle of evidence established upon prudence in this jurisdiction that failure to cross examine a witness on important matter means acceptance of the truth of the witness evidence - see: **Damian Ruhele v. Republic,** Criminal Appeal No. 501 of 2007 (unreported), **Nyerere Nyague v. Republic**, Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2010 and **George Maili Kemboge v. Republic,** Criminal Appeal No. 327 of 2013.

In the digest to the testimony of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that what these witnesses testified is credible, truthful, reliable and trustworthy. In essence, I have no even a single doubt to raise against their testimony. It is trite law that every witness is entitled to credence and must be believed and his/her testimony accepted unless there are good and cogent reasons for not believing a witness. In the case of **Mathias Bundala vs Republic ,** Criminal appeal No. 62 of 2004 CAT at Mwanza where it approved the case of **Goodluck Kyando vs Republic** (2006) TLR 363, the court held that:

> *" It is trite law that every witness is entitled to credence and must be believed and his testimony accepted unless they are good and cogent reasons for not believing a witness".*

That said, I find this ground of appeal of no merit to challenge the conviction of the trial court. The issue of none tendering of photograph, though valid, did not affect the substance of the case but could just add more weight of the prosecution's case which in essence was already sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt as per law.

Next question to consider is whether the trial magistrate failed to consider the appellant's defense testimony as alleged. To consider that, page 10 of the judgment of the trial court is self-explanatory. It reads:

"In his defense, the accused person testified under oath and stated that he did not possess the said government trophy that he was on his way home, he met with the park rangers who asked him if he saw people whom they were chasing but he told them that he didn't see them. He told this court that those park rangers arrested him while he didn't do any wrong and they started beating him and forced him to sign a certain paper which he didn't not know what was on that paper and he signed it by thumb. They then went with him to the police station and locked him, he tendered PF3 to prove that he was beaten by park rangers. This court has considered his defense and find that the same does not carry any weight. This is due to the fact that his defense depended much on the PF3 that he tendered in this court and marked exhibit D1. The said exhibit reveals contrary to what he tells this court as recommendation of the doctor is that the accused person was just trying to deceive this court for purpose of exonerating himself from the offence charged with."

On reflection of this trial court record, the argument that the defense testimony was not considered by the trial magistrate is baseless as it has been extensively dealt with save the fact that it had no evidential value in place of the prosecution's evidence and that the same didn't raise any reasonable doubt. Had he done so, I think the trial magistrate would not have failed to consider it. In my final view on this, this appeal ground fails as well.

Lastly on consideration is on the ground that the trial magistrate failed to consider the mitigating factors of the appellant in imposing the appropriate sentence. The appellant's argument on this has been, he being the first offender, ought to have been considered on the minimum sentence imposed by the law and not the maximum sentence set. In my perusal to the trial magistrate's reasoning as to why he imposed such a severe punishment was for reasons of deterrence of such criminal offenses against our animals (fauna). In fact, I agree that no one will speak for the wellbeing and welfare of these animals save ourselves vide the Wildlife Conservation Officers and park rangers. Though the law imposes maximum sentence to be 30 years and minimum being 20 years, I have not found any good fault to order otherwise as the discretionary powers of the trial magistrate in imposing such a sentence was well exercised.

All this said and done, this Court finds no merit in the appeal. It is thus dismissed in its entirety.

DATED at MUSOMA this 14th day of July, 2023.

THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA
MUSOMA

F.H. Mahimbali

Judge

Court: Judgment delivered today the 14th of July, 2023 via conference in the presence of state attorney Jonas Kirungyo for the republic and Ms. Marry Joachim for the appellant, the later who is also presence in person.

F. L. Moshi,
Deputy Registrar